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Greenhaus: Should the NLRB Revisit Excelsior?

SHOULD THE NLRB REVISIT EXCELSIOR?

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1994, the Supreme Court, in United States Department of Defense v. FLRA,' declared that government agencies were not obligated to
disclose the home addresses of their employees to federal sector unions.2 While the decision required the Court to follow a convoluted path
of statutory cross-references, 3 ultimate resolution depended on whether
such disclosure would constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion of the
personal privacy"4 of employees within the meaning of the Freedom of
Information Act ("FOIA"). 5 In so holding, the Justices concededly
placed public sector unions and private sector unions in different positions.6 Since Excelsior Underwear Inc.7 was decided by the National
Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board") in 1966, the routine release of employee names and addresses by private sector employers has
been required during union organizational campaigns.8 At that time, the
NLRB was concerned that without the names and addresses of the employees, a union would be unable to effectively communicate with bargaining unit employees.9
Notwithstanding Excelsior, the Supreme Court ruled that federal
employees were protected by the Privacy Act,'0 a benefit not enjoyed by
1. 510 U.S. 487 (1994).
2. See id. at 503.
3. See id. at 495.
4. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1994).
5. See 5 U.S.C. § 552.
6. The Court acknowledged as much in the last paragraph of its opinion. See Department of
Defense, 510 U.S. at 503. The Court stated, "[t]o the extent that this prohibition leaves public
sector unions in a position different from that of their private sector counterparts, Congress may
correct the disparity." Id.
7. 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
8. See id. at 1239-40; Randall J. White, Note, Union Representation Election Reform:
Equal Access and the Excelsior Rule, 67 IND. L.J. 129, 141 (1991) (stating that the NLRB has rejected several challenges to the Excelsior rule).
9. See Excelsior, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1240-41.
10. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2) (prohibiting the disclosure of personal information unless such
disclosure is mandatory under the FOIA).
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their private sector counterparts." Thus, some privacy2 concerns of federal employees were found to be protected by statute.
Additionally, the Department of Defense Court, reiterating its
holding in United States Departmentof Justice v. Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press,3 held that the privacy concerns inherent in the
FOIA outweighed the public interest with which that Act was concerned. 4 As Reporters Committee indicated, the basic purpose of the
FOIA is to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny. Thus, the
Court observed that "[d]isclosure of the addresses might allow the unions to communicate more effectively with employees, but it would not
appreciably further 'the citizens right to be informed about what their
government is up to.""' 6. The path followed by the Justices and apparently mandated by the FOIA is in stark contrast to the balancing performed by the NLRB in private sector cases, where the NLRB weighs
the privacy interest of employees against the public interest in effective
collective bargaining. 7 In the NLRB arena, the public interest in effective collective bargaining triumphs." Accordingly, the Justices knew
they were creating a disparity between the private and public sector.

11. See Departmentof Defense, 510 U.S. at 503. "[U]nlike private sector employees, federal
employees enjoy the protection of the Privacy Act, and that statute prohibits the disclosure of the
address lists sought in this case." Id. The Privacy Act prohibits such disclosure unless it is mandatory under the FOIA, See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2).
12. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2); 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).
13. 489 U.S. 749 (1989) (holding that whether disclosure constituted an unwarranted invasion of privacy under Exemption 7() depended on the type of requested document and its relationship to the basic purpose of the FOIA, which is to submit government action to public scrutiny). See id. at 768-69.
14, See Departmentof Defense, 510 U.S. at 502.
15. See Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 754.
16, Department of Defense, 510 U.S. at 497 (quoting Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. 749,
773 (1989).
17. See Excelsior, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1243; The NLRB stated that:
A list of employee names and addresses is not like a customer list, and an employer
would appear to have no significant interest in keeping the names and addresses of his
employees secret (other than a desire to prevent the union from communicating with his
employees-an interest we see no reason to protect). Such legitimate interest in secrecy
as an employer may have is, in any event, plainly outveighed by the substantialpublic
interestin favor of disclosure where, as here, disclosure is a key factor in insuring a fair
and free electorate.
Id. (emphasis added).
18. Until the Reporters Committee decision in 1989, the federal circuit courts also balanced
the privacy interest of the employees against effective collective bargaining and came out on the
side of collective bargaining. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Navy v. FLRA, 840 F.2d 1131 (3d
Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 881 (1988); United States Dep't of the Air Force v. FLRA,
838 F.2d 229 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 880 (1988).
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Because that disparity was created by statute, the Privacy Act, however,
the9 Justices stated that it was up to Congress, not the Court, to correct
1

it.

It is noteworthy that federal sector employees are governed by a
different labor relations statute than private sector employees.2 1 It is also
noteworthy that federal sector employees are protected by privacy statutes that are not applicable to private sector employees.2' However,
Congress looked to experiences in the private sector and the National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") when enacting its public sector counterpart, the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute
("FSLMRS").2 It would therefore appear as if Congress intended to
treat employees in both sectors similarly.' In Department of Defense,
however, the Supreme Court decided that as far as disclosure of names
and addresses were concerned, the two sectors would not be treated

equally.'
This Note submits that the time is ripe for the NLRB to re-examine
Excelsior. The door opened by the Supreme Court in Department oj
Defense suggested that Congress correct the disparity between public
sector and private sector employees that the decision created.2 Nonetheless, Congress has failed to act, and its reluctance to step through that
door may indicate that it believes public sector employees should in-

19. See Departmentof Defense, 510 U.S. at 503.
20. Private sector employees were empowered with collective bargaining rights in 1935
when Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1994). Federal employees had to wait more than forty years to gain similar rights when Congress enacted
Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 known as the Federal Service LaborManagement Relations Statute. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1994).
21. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994).
22. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135; FLRA v. United States Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 958 F.2d
503, 512 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating "[the FSLMRS] is designed to parallel and draw upon principles
of private labor law").
23. See Improved Labor-ManagementRelations in the Federal Service: Hearings on H.R.
13, H.R. 1589, and H.R. 9094 Before the Subcomn. on Civil Service of the House Comm. on Post
Office and Civil Service, 95th Cong. 21 (1977). Congressman William Ford remarked:
My bill touches on allof the basic rights that private employees have under the National Labor Relations Act- and we have had 40 years of experience with that act,
thousands of lawsuits and decisions which have given us a pretty good idea about how
basic some of these rights and restrictions are.
Id.; see also Karl J. Sanders, Casenote, FOIA v. FederalSector Labor Law: Which "PublicInterest" Prevails?,62 U. CN. L. REv. 787 (stating that Congress looked to the experiences in private
sector labor relations to when drafting the FSLMRS).
24. See Department of Defense, 510 U.S. at 503.
25. See id.
at 503. The Court knew that it was creating a disparity and stated that it was up to
Congress to correct it. See id.
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deed enjoy a degree of privacy in their names and addresses. 6 Conse-

quently, if there is to be equalization of position, it is the NLRB's turn
to level the playing field. Accordingly, this Note proposes that the

NLRB re-examine its interpretation of the NLRA and, specifically, its
decision in Excelsior. This Note suggests that private sector employees'
names and addresses not be subjected to mandatory disclosure by their
employer.27 Employees in the private and public sectors should not be
treated differently.
II. BACKGROUND - THE FSLMRS

The NLRB is granted the power to interpret, subject to appeal, the
NLRA! while the Federal Labor Relations Authority ("FLRA") is entrusted with adjudicatory and rulemaking powers concerning the
FSLMRS, also subject to appeal. 29 It is in this context that the most recent debate concerning disclosure of employee addresses has arisen.'0
The FSLMRS requires that federal agencies disclose to a certified
union "to the extent not prohibited by law" data which is "reasonably
available and necessary" for collective bargaining." A problem arises,
however, because disclosure of names and addresses has been held to be
prohibited by the Privacy Act.3 2 That Act forbids government agencies
from disclosing personal information without written permission from

26. As of the time this Note is being written, Congress has not enacted a statute that would
force public employers to disclose the names and addresses of their employees to any union.
27. See Excelsior, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1240 (stating that "[t]he control of the election proceeding, and the determination of the steps necessary to conduct that election fairly [are] matters which
Congress entrusted to the Board alone") (quoting N.L.R.B. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 309
U.S. 206,226 (1940)).
28. See 29 U.S.C. § 150 (1994); see also N.L.R.B. v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266
(1974) (holding the board "has the special function of applying the general provisions of the Act to
the complexities of industrial life").
29. See 5 U.S.C. §7105(A)(1) (1994) (stating "[tihe [FLRA] shall provide leadership in establishing policies and guidance relating to matters under this chapter, and, except as otherwise
provided, shall be responsible for carrying out the purpose of this chapter").
30. Until the Supreme Court decided Departmentof Defense, seven of the circuit courts had
held that federal agencies need not disclose the names and addresses of bargaining unit employees.
See Sanders, supra note 23, at 788 n.6. However, four circuit courts had held that disclosure was
indeed necessary. See id. Because of the disparity, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
the circuit split. See Departmentof Defense, 510 U.S. at 492.
31. See 5 U.S.C. § 7114(b)(4) (1994).
32. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a. The Supreme Court said as much in the Department of Defense
decision. See Departmentof Defense, 510 U.S. at 503.
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the person to whom the information pertains.33 Disclosure of names
and
4
law.
federal
by
prohibited
be
to
seem
therefore
would
addresses
However, there are two important exceptions to the Privacy Act. 5
One exception allows disclosure for the "routine use" of the information.36 The other exception, relevant to this discussion, is section
552a(b)(2) of the Privacy Act, which allows disclosure when the information in question would otherwise be obtainable under the FOIA.
The FOIA mandates that government agencies "shall make" certain
information "available to the public."'37 There is an exception to such
disclosure, however, that allows government agencies to withhold
"personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."3
This is commonly referred to as FOIA "Exemption 6"" and is the crucial area of this particular privacy analysis. 40 In the public sector collective bargaining context, courts have routinely struggled with the proper
balancing test when determining whether disclosure of certain information would qualify as a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privay."'41 Until 1989, when considering privacy concerns under Exemption 6,42 federal courts upheld the FLRA's decision to balance the public
employees' privacy concerns against the public's interest in effective
collective bargaining.43 In that year, however, the Supreme Court decided Reporters Committee, which provided the federal courts guidance

33. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1994). That section states, "[n]o agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to
another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the
individual to whom the record pertains .
Id.
L...
34. I.
35. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2) (stating that disclosure is prohibited unless such disclosure is
required under section 552 of this title); 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3) (stating that disclosure is prohibited
unless such disclosure would be for a routine use as defined in subsection (a)(7) of this section and
described under subsection (e)(4)(D) of this section).
36. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3). This exception allows for the disclosure of records that are
"compatible with the purpose for which [the information] was collected." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(7).
This Note will not address that exception.
37. See 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(6).

38. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See Sanders, supra note 23, at 788.

42. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).
43. See Sanders, supra note 23, at 797; see also United States Dep't of Agric. v. FLRA, 836
F.2d 1139, 1143-44 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that deference to the [FLRA's] expertise insofar as it
has determined disclosure will help effectuate the policies in the [FSLMRS]).
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as to what the new, proper balancing test should be when evaluating
privacy concerns implicated by the FOIA.'
Reporters Committee involved the requested release of "rap
sheets." 45 The Court thus had to balance an individual's privacy interest
in nondisclosure of the "rap sheets" against the public interest to be
furthered by such release.4 6 After first stating that the individual had a
substantial privacy interest in the information contained within the "rap
sheet," 47 the Court observed that whether disclosure constituted an
' depended
"unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"48
on the relationship of the requested information to the basic, underlying purpose of the
FOIA.49 That purpose, the Court held, was the citizens' right to be informed about "what their government was up to."50
Though Reporters Committee did not deal with disclosure of employee names and addresses, it nonetheless signaled a change for the
federal courts in that arena. When determining whether disclosure of
employee names and addresses by federal agencies was mandatory under the FOIA, courts were now to balance the privacy concerns implicated by such disclosure, not against the public's interest in effective

collective bargaining, but rather, against the public's interest in subjecting a government agency's action to public scrutiny. This apparently
subtle change in the balancing has
already changed the way courts ap2
proach this disclosure problem.1

44. Reporters Committee was concerned with Exemption 7(C), rather than Exemption 6, of
the FOIA. Exemption 7(C) excludes from disclosure "records or information compiled for law
enforcement purposes ... [the release of which] could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C).
45. See Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 762.
46. See id
47. See id at 771. The Court held that even though an event may not be wholly "private,"
that does not mean that an individual has no interest in limiting the disclosure or dissemination of
that information. See id. at 770. Most information contained in a rap sheet could indeed be discovered elsewhere. See id. at 752. That fact, however, does not limit the privacy interest that one has
in such information. See id. at 771.
48. See Repoerters Committee, 489 U.S. at 772. The standard under Exception 7(C) is
"unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." The standard under Exception 6 is "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." (emphasis added). See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(7)(C), (b)(6)
(1994) (emphasis added).
49. See Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 772,
50. See id at 773 (quoting Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1976)).
51. Seeid.at776.
52. See infra note 64 and accompanying text. The NLRB expressly rejected in Excelsior the
argument that disclosure of "employees names and addresses subjects employees to the dangers of
harassment and coercion in their homes." Excelsior 156 N.L.R.B. at 1244. The interest in effective
collective bargaining wins out. See id.
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Reporters Committee was decided in the context of Exception 7(C)
to the FOIA, not Exception 6." However, subsequent to Reporters
Committee, several courts have extended the holding to encompass Exemption 6 as well,' and the Supreme Court reinforced those holdings in
its Departmentof Defense decision."
In Departmentof Defense, the Supreme Court, following the logical lead of its Reporters Committee decision, held that the names and
addresses of employees of federal agencies were not subject to mandatory disclosure to a requesting union.56 Significantly, the reasoning exhibited by the Court revolved around the interrelationship of three federal laws: the FSLMRS, the Privacy Act, and the FOIA. Viewed most
simply, the FSLMRS requires disclosure to a union of information that
would not be prohibited by law.57 Such information in some instances,
however, may be prohibited by the Privacy Act.58 In turn, the Privacy
Act exempts information from possible non-disclosure that would otherwise be obtainable under the relevant provisions of the FOIA."9 The
final piece of the puzzle is the exemption in the FOIA which prohibits
disclosure where to do so would constitute a "clearly unwarranted inva-

sion of personal privacy." '
Until the Supreme Court's decision in Department of Defense, the
protectible privacy interest was always balanced against the public's

53. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (stating that this section does not apply to information that
could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy); see also
5 U.S.C. §552(b)(6) (stating that this section does not apply to personnel and medical files and
similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy).
54. See, e.g., FLRA v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1055 (1990); FLRA v. United States Dep't of Defense, 984 F.2d 370, 375
(10th Cir. 1993). "Because disclosure of federal employees' home addresses has nothing to do
with public scrutiny of government activities, 'there is no relevant public purpose to be weighed'
against the invasion of federal employee privacy." Id. (quoting FLRA v. United States Dep't of
Veterans Affairs, 958 F.2d 503, 513 (2d Cir. 1992)).
55. See Departmentof Defense, 510 U.S. at 496 n.6.
56. See id.
at 503.
57. See 5 U.S.C. § 7114(b)(4) (1994) (qualifying the employer's duty to furnish information
for collective bargaining by exempting data that is "prohibited by law").
58. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1994) ("No agency shall disclose any record which is contained
in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except
pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the
record pertains ....).
59. See id.
§ 552.
60. Id. § 552(b)(6). See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text for a further discussion of
the interrelationship of these federal statutes.
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interest in effective collective bargaining. 6' And, though initially an individual's privacy interest in his name and address was characterized as
strong,62 that position was temporarily overtaken by the view that the
interest in such information was less than compelling. 6 However, since
Reporters Committee, courts have been better able to clarify and articu-

late the privacy interest an individual may have in his name and address
and it has become apparent that courts now reason that such an interest
is indeed substantial." This is probably due to the fact that the test
enunciated in Reporters Committee tilts the scale, more often than not,
in favor of the privacy interest of the employee.6
The now acceptable line of reasoning was made apparent by Justice Thomas in his Department of Defense decision for the Court.6
While noting that only a minimal privacy interest was necessary in the
collective bargaining context to outweigh the nonexistent relevant public interest in ascertaining what its government was up to, Justice Thomas also noted that, in terms of names and addresses, "[i]t is enough for
present purposes to observe that the employees' interest in nondisclosure is not insubstantial." 67 The decision additionally notes various other

reasons why an employee may not want his name and address disseminated to a requesting bargaining representative. 6' For instance, many
people "simply do not want to be disturbed at home by work-related
matters." 69 In this regard, Justice Thomas observed that the home has

61. See Departmentof Defense, 510 U.S. at 495; supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the balancing tests undertaken by various federal courts.
62. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1923 v. United States Dep't of Health
and Human Serv., 712 F.2d 931, 932 (4th Cir. 1983).
63. See, e.g, American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1760 v. FLRA, 786 F.2d 554, 556
(2d Cir. 1986).
64. See Sheet Metal Workers v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 135 F.3d 891, 905 (3rd Cir. 1998)
(holding that "[t]he privacy interest of employees in the non-disclosure of their names and addresses substantially outweighs the slight public interest put forth by the union"); Painting Indus.
of Hawaii v. Dep't of Air Force, 26 F.3d 1479, 1484 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that "workers on
federally-funded construction projects have a substantial privacy interest in information tying their
names and addresses to precise payroll records").
65. This is evidenced by the fact that since the test was shifted in Reporters Committee to a
balancing against subjecting what the government was doing to the light of public scrutiny, many
circuit courts have held that an individual's privacy interest wins. See Sanders, supra note 25, at
788 n.6.
66. See United States Department of Defense v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487, 497-503 (1994).
67. liLat 500.
68. See id. at 501.
69. See Department of Defense, 510 U.S. at 501. The decision further states, "[e]mployees
can lessen the chance of such unwanted contacts by not revealing their addresses to their exclusive
representative." Id
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traditionally been a place where an individual's privacy interests deserve special consideration. ° Because of this, he concluded that, "[w]e
are reluctant to disparage the privacy of the home, which is accorded
special consideration in our Constitution, laws, and traditions."'
Department of Defense was a culmination of many federal court
decisions rendered subsequent to Reporters Committee which illustrated
that, when compelled to balance an individual's privacy interest against
the public's interest in disclosure of government operations, as the
FOTA requires, many courts opted to stress the substantial privacy interest an employee has in his name and address.
As a consequence of what has been noted above, public sector
employers are now under no obligation to disclose the names and addresses of their employees to a public sector union. And, although this
places public sector unions and private sector unions on unequal footing, Justice Thomas suggested that it would be up to Congress to correct
that disparity.' This, however, Congress has not yet accomplished.
The question that remains is what, if anything, should be done to
place public sector employees and private sector employees on a level
playing field? Notwithstanding that employees in the public sector enjoy a greater degree of privacy in their names and address than do those
in the private sector,75 it is without doubt that Congress modeled the
FLRS on private sector labor law and thus envisioned both sets of employees as having similar rights and enjoying similar privileges.76
In deciding Departmentof Defense, the Supreme Court admittedly
created the now existing disparity.' However, as stated earlier, the Jus-

70. See hiL
71. See id. (citing Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970)).
72. See, e.g., FLRA v. United States Dep't of Defense, 984 F.2d 370, 374 (10th Cir. 1993)
(agreeing with a majority of circuits that "employees possess more than a de minimis privacy interest in their home addresses"); FLRA v. United States Dep't of Defense, 977 F.2d 545, 549 (11th
Cir. 1992) (characterizing the privacy interest in a home address as "important"); United States
Dep't of Navy v. FLRA, 966 F.2d 747, 756 (3d Cir. 1992) (acknowledging that home addresses
implicate a meaningful privacy interest).
73. See Departmentof Defense, 510 U.S. at 503.
74. See id. In her concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg noted that although she was hesitant
to create a disparity between federal sector unions and their private sector counterparts, she concurred in Justice Thomas' judgment while also recognizing that Congress may correct that disparity. See id. at 509 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
75. See id. at 503.
76. See Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 107-08 (1983)
(stating that there is no evidence that the FSLMRS departed from the basic assumption underlying
collective bargaining in both the public and private sector).
77. See Departmentof Defense, 510 U.S. at 503.
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tices invited Congress to correct this potential problem which it has not,
to date, accomplished.78 Consequently, Congress's inaction on this issue
may imply many things. For instance, Congress may simply agree with
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Department of Defense that federal
law prohibits the disclosure of names and addresses of federal employees. Or, perhaps more significantly, Congress may agree that employees
in general do indeed have a privacy interest in their names and addresses. If this is so, then perhaps it is time for the NLRB to re-evaluate
its holding in Excelsior, which articulated the policy of required disclosure of employees' names and addresses during an election. 9 If public
sector employees have a protectible privacy interest in their names and
addresses, as illustrated by federal court decisions of the last few years,
then surely private sector employees do as well.8
To be sure, the Privacy Act and the FOIA do not apply to private
sector employees."' Thus, private sector employees are not given the
protection of those statutes. However, it can be argued persuasively that
there is no significant factor that differentiates a public sector employee
from a private sector employee which justifies the public sector enjoying a greater degree of privacy in their names and addresses than the
private sector. It is simply not logical that one group of employees, and
not the other, chooses to allow a union to invade their privacy solely by
accepting employment.
One argument advanced under the Excelsior rule is that, without a
list of names and addresses, a union is unable to engage in effective
contact with employees. A worthy counter-argument advanced by
Robert Lewis over thirty years ago, however, is that it has been observed that unions are more often than not able to obtain the names of
ninety-nine to one hundred percent of eligible voters within a short period of time." Furthermore, it is easier now, with improved technology,

78. See id. "Tothe extent that this prohibition leaves public sector unions in a different position from that of their private sector counterparts, Congress may correct that disparity." Id.
79. See Excelsior,156 N.L.R.B. at 1239.
80. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
81. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994).
82. See Joseph Pass Jr., Comment, Dilemma in Labor Law: The Right to Own Versus the
Right to Know, 5 DUQ. L. REV.77, 79 (1966-67) (explaining that "[b]efore a union may effectively campaign for membership in a plant, it is obviously necessary that it be able to communicate with the employees in order to inform them of the union program and intended manner of
operation"); David S. Heinsma, Comment, Names, Addresses and the NLRB: Some Implications of

the Excelsior Case, 1 GA. L. REv. 646, 651 (1967) (stating that the privacy basis for the Excelsior
rule was an informed electorate).
83. See Robert Lewis, NLRB Intrudes on the Right of Privacy, 17 LAB. L.J. 280, 281 n.4
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to obtain names and addresses of desired employees. Once a name is
known, an address is relatively easy to obtain." The Court, in Department of Defense, observed that "[a]n individual's interest in controlling

the dissemination of information regarding personal matters does not
dissolve simply because that information is available to the public in
some form."85 Though the Court in that case was referring to public
sector employees, the same rationale should be applied to the private
sector as well.
Ill. BACKGROUND -

THE NLRA

The relationship of private employers and employees is defined by
the NLRA. Before the NLRA was enacted, significant unrest and strife
characterized labor-management relations." Thus, Congress declared
that a fundamental policy of American labor law is to "encourag[e] the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and... [protect] the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of
negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection."88
In adopting the NLRA, Congress stressed the importance of collective bargaining.89 Congress believed that employees negotiating as a
group would wield more power than would employees on an individual
basis.' Congress therefore gave employees the rights to choose to or(1966).
84. See id.
85. Department of Defense, 510 U.S. at 500.
86. The NLRA was originally enacted as the Wagner Act, and is now comprised of two additional acts: the Labor Management Relations Act (the Taft-Hartley Act), and the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (the Landrum-Griffith Act).
87. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994). Congress found that:
The denial by some employers of the right of employers to oragize and refuseal by
some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and
other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary effect of
burdening or obstructing commerce ....
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and
bargaine collectivly safeguards commerce from injury ....
Id.
88. Id.
89. See supra note 87; see also NLRB v. United States Sonics Corp., 312 F.2d 610, 615 (lst
Cir. 1963) (stating "[u]nilateral [bargaining] activities are antithetical to the basic philosophy of
the Act which is the encouragement of collective - as opposed to individual-bargaining").
90. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).
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ganize, to select a representative, to empower that representative to bargain on their behalf, and to refuse to engage in these same activities.9
Employees can take advantage of the aforementioned rights
through secret ballot elections which are sanctioned and conducted by
the NLRB.' The NLRB has declared that "[ain election can serve its
true purpose only if the surrounding conditions enable employees to
register a free and untrammeled choice for or against a bargaining representative."93 In essence, the NLRB believes that a group of employees
should be free to choose or reject a bargaining representative as they
wish. Moreover, the NLRB helps to ensure this freedom of choice by
requiring that elections be conducted under laboratory conditions and
that they be fair.9 4 While what "fair" constitutes has been a subject in
seemingly perpetual dispute, the NLRB has found in one respect that
this freedom of choice may be compromised when employees are not

aware of information that may lead them to choose a bargaining representative. 5 The NLRB has thus held that an employee who has had "an
effective opportunity to hear [all] the arguments concerning representation is in a better position to make a more fully informed and reasonable
choice."96
Implicit in Excelsior and other holdingse is that a union must be
furnished certain information that would facilitate its ability to advance
its arguments and provide its point of view to employees.9" Only in this

91. Id. § 157 (detailing the basic rights of employees, which can usually be referred to as
simply "section 7").
92 Id. § 159(e).
93. In re General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126 (1948).
94. See Derek C. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in RepresentationElections Under the NationalLabor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 38, 53 (1964). Though "fairness" is not
mentioned in or required by the NLRA, this prominent scholar has stated that "the concept seems
much too obvious, too central to the very idea of an election, not to be taken into account." Id.
95. See Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1240 (1966).
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., In re S.L. Allen & Co. 1 N.L.R.B. 714 (1936) (stating that the interchange of
ideas and communication of facts are of the essence of the bargaining process); Oregon Coast Operators Ass'n, 113 N.L.R.B. 1338, 1345-46 (1955), enforced 246 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1957)
(concluding that a necessary part of the duty to bargain in good faith was the requirement of furnishing information in the employer's possession which was relevant and necessary to assist the
union in presenting its proposals and engaging in bargaining in the most intelligent and efficacious
manner).
98. See Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. NLRB, 196 F.2d 1012, 1014-15 (3d Cir. 1952)
(holding that an employer has to disclose information with respect to wages paid for comparable
employment by other employers); In re General Controls Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 1341, 1354-56 (1950)
(holding that an employer has to disclose a list of the names of employees who had received merit
increases during the last time such increases were granted).
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way can an employee become aware of both sides of the collective bargaining process." Additionally, due to their position of authority, employers have been found to enjoy the inherent advantage of the "captive
audience speech."'" Thus, by requiring disclosure of certain identifying
information, the NLRB sought to level the collective bargaining playing
field. 10 1
On February 4, 1966, the NLRB rendered the Excelsior decision
requiring employee identifying information. In Excelsior, the NLRB
held that within seven days after the Regional Director had approved a
consent election agreement or after the direction of an election, the employer had to file an election eligibility list, containing the names and
addresses of all eligible voters.lr Moreover, such information was to be
made available to all parties in the case.
As its rationale, the NLRB stated that "access of all employees to
[organizational] communications can be insured only if all parties have
the names and addresses of all the voters."'0 4 Furthermore, should the
employer fail to adhere to the rule set down in Excelsior, then the Board
will set aside the election."0 5
In deciding Excelsior, the NLRB sought to achieve two results.
First, it sought to give the Union access to employees at their homes,
something an employer is not allowed to do. 0 Theoretically, at least,
this would neutralize the right of an employer to give a captive audience
speech. Secondly, it sought to grant unions the right of access to em-

99. See Randall J. White, Note, Union Representation Election Reform: EqualAccess and
the Excelsior Rule, 67 IND. L.J. 129, 131-32 (1991). Unlike the Union, the employer enjoys "builtin" access to employees because they work on his property and because the employer can exclude
the Union from the workplace by asserting his property rights. Id. In Excelsior, the NLRB sought
to equalize the position of a union and an employer. See Excelsior,156 N.L.R.B. at 1239-44.
100. See Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 409 (1953). Since this decision, as a general matter, employers have been free to require employee attendance at campaign speeches without granting unions a right to reply. See id.
101. See NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 437-39 (1967) (holding that an employer
must furnish to his employees' collective bargaining representative information which is relevant
to the negotiation or administration of a collective bargaining agreement between them).
102. See Excelsior, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1239.
103. See id. See generally Heinsma, supra note 82 (discussing the potential implications of
the Excelsior decision as viewed only one year after it was handed down).
104. Excelsior, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1241.
105. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 763 (1969) (stating that failure to comply
with a Regional Director's order to make information available is grounds for setting aside an
election in federal court).
106. See Peoria Plastic Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 545, 547-48 (1957). Any attempt by an employer to
personally campaign in an employee's home is per se coercive and an unfair labor practice. See id.
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ployees without infringing on the employer's property rights.'O' Unfor-

tunately, however, employee privacy rights were sacrificed at the expense of these aforementioned two goals.

By granting unions access to employees at their homes, the NLRB
invited the possibility that employees might be subjected to harassment
and coercion in their homes.'

Nonetheless, the NLRB brushed this

consideration aside in Excelsior by observing that the mere possibility
of abuse occurring was not a sufficient basis for denying the opportunity
for home visits altogether.' Excelsior also encourages mass union
mailings to employees' homes by granting a union access to employees'
names and addresses. Indeed, the private employees' privacy rights
were subordinated to and allowed to suffer at the expense of the Excelsior holding. "0
IV. HARMONIZING THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
1 In that
The Excelsior rule has subsisted for over thirty years."
time, commentators have argued over whether Excelsior infringes on an
employee's privacy rights."2 Now, however, in light of Department of
Defense, it is time for the NLRB to re-address the privacy concerns that
the Supreme Court addressed in that decision." 3 That case clearly indi-

107. See NLRA v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956) (holding that nonemployees can be excluded from an employer's premises if there are reasonable alternative methods
by which the union can reach the employees with its message). The employer in Excelsior also
claimed that there was a property interest in the employee list, to which the NLRB responded:
an employer would appear to have no significant interest in keeping the names and addresses of his employees secret .... Such legitimate interest in secrecy as an employer
may have is, in any event, plainly outweighed by the substantial public interest in favor
of disclosure where, as here, disclosure is a key factor in insuring a fair and free electorate.
Excelsior 156 N.L.R.B. at 1243.
108. See Lewis, supra note 83, at 283. This article was published the same year that Excelsior
was decided, and thus is probative when considering the potential problems with the decision.
109. See Excelsior, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1244 (1966).
110. Seeid. at 1239-40.
111. The NLRB has rejected several challenges to the Excelsior rule that are relevant to the
equal access issue. See White, supra note 99, at 141. And in the decision itself, the NLRB dismissed the objection that compelled disclosure of the employee list violated the employer property
interest in the list, finding that no such right existed. See Excelsior, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1243.
112. See, e.g., Heinsma, supra note 82; Lewis, supra note 83; Bok, supra note 94.
113. See Departmentof Defense, 510 U.S. at 503. Again, federal employees are protected by
federal statutes, a fact which distinguishes them from their private sector counterparts, But the underlying rationale for respecting a federal employee's privacy rights is clearly the same as it would
be for a private sector employee.
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cates that there are privacy issues that must be resolved when considering disclosure
of employees' names and addresses to a requesting un114
ion.
Noteworthy also is that, in deciding Excelsior, the NLRB implied
that should the encroachment on an employee's privacy rights become a
serious issue, then any harassment that did occur could be dealt with
remedially." 5 However, the NLRB has never shown the willingness to
address this issue. Thus, the time has passed for dealing with such
problems on a case-by-case basis, and, instead, public and private sector
employees should enjoy an equality of position.
In articulating the privacy interest provided for in the FOIA," 6 Justice Thomas made clear that employees should enjoy some privacy in
their names and addresses."7 Indeed, he noted that even though that kind
of information would probably be available through other sources, employees nonetheless still enjoyed such privacy."' Justice Thomas stated,
as noted previously that "[a]n individual's interest in controlling the dissemination of information regarding personal matters does not dissolve
simply because that information may be available to the public in some
form."'" 9 Furthermore, Justice Thomas hypothesized as to some of the
reasons an employee would not want his/her name and address distributed to a union:
Whatever the reason that these employees have chosen not to become
members of the union or to provide the union with their addresses,
however, it is clear that they have some nontrivial privacy interest in
nondisclosure, and in avoiding the influx of union-related mail, and,
perhaps, union-related telephone calls or visits, that would follow disclosure. °
In concluding that employees have a recognizable privacy interest
in their names and addresses, Justice Thomas also acknowledged that
some people simply did not want to be bothered at home with workrelated matters.' 2 ' He stated that disclosure of names and addresses

114. See id. at 500-01.
115. See Excelsior, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1244.
116. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994) (stating that the standard is "[a] clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy").
117. See Departmentof Defense, 510 U.S. at 500-01.
118. Id. at 500.

119.

l

120. Id. at 501.

121. See id.
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would only increase these unwanted contacts," and the majority of the
Court was unwilling to "disparage the privacy of the home, which is ac-

corded special consideration in our Constitution, laws, and traditions."'"
Thus, Justice Thomas concluded that employees have a recognizable
privacy interest in their names and addresses.' 4
When considering that aspect of the Department of Defense decision dealing with privacy rights in names and addresses, it is apparent

that all of the reasons in support of why government employees enjoy a
privacy interest in their names and addresses are just as applicable to
private sector employees. Private sector employees may not want to be
bothered by union-related home visits.'2 They may not want to be cluttered with union-related mail. And, concededly, while the balancing test
utilized is different in the private sector than in the public sector, 2 6 the
manner in which Justice Thomas articulated an employee's privacy interest in his name and address is surely encompassing enough to be
applicable to the private sector.1 27 Again though, Justice Thomas began
his analysis by acknowledging that public sector employees are protected by statutes, while private sector employees are not. Nonetheless,
his articulation of an employee's privacy interest is probative.
Significant also is a major flaw in the underpinning of the Excelsior decision. The NLRB therein made clear that it was not concerned

122. See Departmentof Defense, 510 U.S. at 501.
123. l
124. See id. As an interesting side note, Justice Thomas noted that even the FLRA has acknowledged that "employees have some privacy interest in their home addresses." See id. at 501
n.8.
125. For a discussion of the "home visits" doctrine, see Leonard Bierman, Justice Thomas
and Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB: A Reply to ProfessorRobert A. Gorman, 10 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 299,
304 (1992) and Leonard Bierman, Extending Excelsior, 69 IND. L.J. 521, 522-23 (1994). The
"home visits" doctrine is controversial, not only for reasons involving personal privacy, but also
because some commentators favor expanding the doctrine so a union could take advantage of a
home visit before the seven-day window that Excelsiorprovides for. See White, supra note 99, at
163-64. White states:
[T]he idea that a union may have only have one week to use the type of access that an
employer may have exploiting for years seems laughable.... Extending Excelsior
would give unions the same ability that employers possess: the ability to contact employees as early as they choose and the opportunity to develop early pro-union attitudes
that employees will retain throughout the campaign.
Il
126. In the private sector, the privacy interest is weighed against the public's interest in effective collective bargaining. See, e.g., NLRB v. Assoc. Gen. Contractors, 633 F.2d 766, 770-71
(9th Cir. 1980), cert.denied, 452 U.S. 915 (1981).
127. See Department of Defense, 510 U.S. at 503. Justice Thomas stated that the "home is
accorded special consideration in our Constitution, laws, and traditions." Id.
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with the potential harassment an employee mightexperience as a result
of a union having greater access to an employee at home." Rather, the
NLRB stressed various analogies such as public elections where voter
registration lists are open to public inspection,'29 corporate election
contests where management must either provide stockholders with
names and addresses of other stockholders or mail campaign material
for them, 30 and internal union elections where the candidate is entitled
to have the unions distribute his campaign literature to all union members,' all situations where a person's name had to be disclosed to a
third party. One commentator has noted that in these examples, however, the person allegedly having his/her privacy violated has in some
fashion consented to such a violation: by registering to vote, by purchasing the corporate security, or by joining a union.'32 It can hardly be argued that an employee chooses in any fashion to allow the union, as a
third party, to invade his privacy solely by accepting employment with
his employer.
In the Excelsior decision, the NLRB responded to the possibility of
harassment and coercion of employees-of possible invasions of privacy-by assuring that an appropriate remedy would be fashioned in
such cases.' The time has past for dealing with these violations on a
case by case basis. A blanket rule should be established wherein private
sector employees are no longer required to disclose their names and addresses.
Furthermore, it has been posited by one commentator that an adequate protection of the right of privacy should not concern itself with
post-invasion remedies, such as are implied by the NLRB, but rather
with avoiding the possibility of invasion before it actually occurs.'" If
this theory of the protection of privacy rights is accepted, then the

128. See Excelsior, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1244.
129. See id. at 1242.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See Lewis, supra note 83, at 283. Robert Lewis has even suggested that the analogies
used by the NLRB in Excelsior were highly questionable. The analogy that Robert Lewis focuses
on is public elections where voter registration lists are open to public inspection. See id. This is a
questionable analogy, he suggests, because the public inspection of registered voters is designed to
prevent fraud in elections, rather than aiding a political candidate in his campaign. See id.
133. See Excelsior, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1244.
134. See Heinsma, supra note 82, at 649. Heinsma states that "adequate protection of the right
of privacy should concern itself with avoiding the possibility of invasion, rather than post-invasion
remedies." Id.
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NLRB may have already been presented with a case,'35 albeit more than
thirty years ago, which exemplifies the kind of employer conduct which
would both satisfy the policies behind Excelsior and at the same time
respect the language in Departmentof Defense.
In British Auto Parts,Inc.,'36 the employer sought to comply with
the Excelsior requirement by giving his employees the option to furnish
part of the required information.'37 The employer sent a letter to each
employee informing them that the NLRB had requested the names and
addresses of the employees, that the information would be forwarded to
a union, and enclosed an envelope addressed to the Regional Director
for the employees' use if they desired to furnish their address.'38 After
the union filed objections to the election based on a violation of the Excelsior rule, the NLRB set aside the results of the election, finding that
the employer had clearly not complied with the Excelsior requirement.'39
While the employer in British Auto Parts may not have specifically
complied with the Excelsior requirement, the approach, which allowed
the employees to forward their addresses to the union if they so desired,
certainly preserved the employees' right of privacy without adversely
affecting a union's right to contact them."
This Note suggests that most individuals believe that they have a
right to be left alone, and the employer's approach in BritishAuto Parts
maintains this right while simultaneously allowing the possibility of
communication with the union that was, after all, the theory behind Excelsior. Though the argument can be made that employees may be intimidated by the threat of retaliation by their employer should they disclose their names and addresses, one author notes that many unions
today are infested with members of organized crime, thus rendering a
home visit by certain union officials equally, if not more, intimidating. 4'
135. See British Auto Parts, Inc., 160 N.L.R.B. 239 (1960).
136. 160 N.L.R.B. 239.
137. See id. at 239.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 240-41.
140. See Heinsma, supra note 82, at 649. Heinsma suggests that:
If privacy is respected and the Excelsior rule accommodated, the conduct of the employer in British Auto Partsmay well be the happy medium. Any concern that employers would seek to interfere with those employees that did foward their addresses to the
Regional Director or seek to restrain enployees from forwarding their addresses should
be short-lived in view of the NLRB's experience in handling unfair labor pratice cases
based upon employer interference.
Id.
141. See Clyde W. Summers, Union Trusteeships and Union Democracy, 24 U. MICH. J.L.
REFoRM 689, 690 (1991). Summers cites to several examples where organized crime controls un-
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If privacy is to be respected and the Excelsior rule accommodated,
the employer's conduct in British Auto Partsmay well be an acceptable
compromise. Indeed, it would at least afford private sector employees
who do not desire to join unions a guarantee of privacy in their names
and addresses, as employees in the public sector were assured in the
Departmentof Defense decision.
The time is ripe to re-evaluate Excelsior in light of Department of
Defense. A similar re-evaluation of the employer's conduct, or conduct
similar thereto, as in British Auto Parts should lead the NLRB to the
conclusion that employees in the private sector have been subject to invasions of their privacy for far too long. The Supreme Court reached
that result in Department of Defense when it found that disclosing
names and addresses of public sector employees was a "clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy." 42 The NLRB should likewise so find.
V. CONCLUSION
The Department of Defense decision was a landmark in the field of
public sector collective bargaining. In essence, the decision stands for
the proposition that, due to the interrelationship of the FSLMRS, the
Privacy Act, and the FOIA, employees of the federal government are
accorded an amount of privacy in their names and addresses that leaves
their employer under no obligation to disclose that information to a requesting union.14 1 What makes this decision even more monumental is
the long-standing policy in the private sector of requiring disclosure of
the same information in the same situation."'4
Since Department of Defense was decided, Congress has not followed Justice Thomas' suggestion to correct the disparity between public and private sector unions that the decision created. 45 Therefore, at
the present time, private sector employees routinely have their names
and addressed disclosed to a requesting union, while public sector employees do not. 46 Obviously, this leaves private sector employees with

ions through "fear and intimidation." See id. at 691-94. An example of this is illustrated, where a
"union member who spoke up in a union meeting to oppose the appointment of a business agent
was shot down in front of his home the next morning." I& at 691.
142. Departmentof Defense, 510 U.S. at 503.
143. See id. at 503.
144. See Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, (1966).
145. See Departmentof Defense, 510 U.S. at 503.
146. Again, the argument has also been made that Excelsiorshould not only not be lessened
in its scope, but instead broadened so a union could take advantage of having possession of the
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unprotected privacy rights in contrast to those benefits enjoyed by their
public sector counterparts.
It is incumbent upon the NLRB to revisit Excelsior. While not
challenging anything as drastic as the constitutionality of the NLRA as a
whole, this Note nevertheless challenges the modem day ramifications
of the Excelsior decision handed down over thirty years ago. The NLRB
is today less concerned with policing every last intricacy that makes up
a representation election. 47 By eliminating the requirement that all
names and addresses of private sector employees be forwarded to a union, the NLRB would be merely following their own lead.'48
There is no logical basis to continue to subject private sector employees to invasions of privacy solely due to their status as private sector employees. Public and private sector employees should be treated
the same. By eliminating the Excelsior requirement now imposed on
employers, or at least modifying it to enable the employer to engage in
reasonable and fair conduct as was demonstrated in British Auto Parts,
where the union's right to communicate with the employees was properly balanced with the employee's right to privacy, the NLRB would be
stepping boldly (and correctly) into the twenty-first century, where employees should not have their names and addresses disclosed to a union
unless they explicitly agree to such disclosure.

David Greenhaus

names and addresses of employees in a bargaining unit even earlier than the seven day window
provided for presently. See White, supra note 99, at 163-64 (1991).
147. See Midland Nat'l Life Ins., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 129 (1982) (stating that the NLRB could
not police the details surrounding every election) (citing In re General Shoe Corp. 77 N.L.R.B.
124, 126 (1948)). But see Mitchellace, Inc. v. NLRB, 90 F.3d 1150, 1155 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating
that the Sixth Circuit has more "flexible" standards than the NLRB in setting aside an election).
148. See id.
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